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Abstract—This paper studies an N -coalition non-cooperative
game problem, where the players in the same coalition coop-
eratively minimize the sum of their local cost functions under
a directed communication graph, while collectively acting as
a virtual player to play a non-cooperative game with other
coalitions. Moreover, it is assumed that the players have no
access to the explicit functional form but only the function
value of their local costs. To solve the problem, a discrete-time
gradient-free Nash equilibrium seeking strategy, based on the
gradient tracking method, is proposed. Specifically, a gradient
estimator is developed locally based on Gaussian smoothing
to estimate the partial subgradients, and a gradient tracker
is constructed locally to trace the average sum of the partial
subgradients among the players within the coalition. With a
sufficiently small constant step-size, we show that all players’
actions approximately converge to the Nash equilibrium at
a geometric rate under a strongly monotone game mapping
condition. Numerical simulations are conducted to verify the
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
Index Terms—Nash equilibrium seeking, gradient-free meth-
ods, non-cooperative games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, great efforts have been devoted to the research
of collaboration and competition among multiple rational
decision-makers, of which distributed optimization and Nash
equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative games are the two
main lines. In particular, distributed optimization problem
is concerned with a network of agents that cooperatively
minimize a combination of their local cost functions, which
has shown great interests in the applications of parameter
estimation [1], source localization [2], resource allocation
[3], multi-robot coordination [4], etc. Non-cooperative game,
on the other hand, considers a group of players that are
self-interest motivated to minimize their own individual cost
function in response to other players’ actions, which has been
widely applied in the fields of transportation network control
[5], power network control [6], electricity markets [7], smart
grids [8], etc.
This paper subsumes the research of both distributed op-
timization and Nash equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative
games, by considering an N -coalition non-cooperative game.
In this game, each coalition consists of a number of players.
On the one hand, each coalition can be regarded as a virtual
player that aims to minimize its cost function by adjusting its
actions based on other coalition’s actions in a non-cooperative
game. On the other hand, the coalition’s cost function is
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defined as the sum of the local cost functions associated to
the players in the corresponding coalition, and minimization
of such cost is realized by the collaboration among the
corresponding players. Moreover, it is assumed that the players
have no access to the explicit functional form but only the
function value of their local costs. A discrete-time gradient-
free Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is developed to drive
the players’ actions to the Nash equilibrium.
A. Related Work
Vast results on the design of Nash equilibrium seeking
algorithms have been reported to solve matrix games [9],
potential games [10], aggregate games [11]–[14], generalized
games [15]–[18], to list a few. For the N -coalition game
problem, the formulation is related to the problem of two
sub-networks zero-sum games (e.g., [19], [20]), where two ad-
versarial networks have opposing objectives with regard to the
optimization of a common cost function, being collaboratively
minimized by the agents in the corresponding network. Then,
the N -coalition game problem is essentially an extension of
such problem with the number of subnetworks being N . To
solve the problem, the works in [21] and [22] proposed a
Nash equilibrium seeking strategy, where a dynamic average
consensus protocol was adopted to estimate the averaged
gradients of the coalitions’ cost functions, and a gradient play
method was implemented to drive the states to the equilibrium.
These works were further improved in [23] to reduce the
communication and computation costs by incorporating an
interference graph which characterizes the interactions among
the players in each coalition. The N -coalition game problem
was also studied in [24], where the players are subject to
both local set constraints and a coupled inequality constraint,
and the associated cost functions are allowed to be non-
smooth. A distributed algorithm with the use of projected
operators, subgradient dynamics, and differential inclusions
was proposed to find the generalized Nash equilibrium. Dif-
ferent from all these works, the authors in [25] proposed an
extremum seeking-based approach without the knowledge on
the explicit expressions of the players’ local cost functions,
which is most relevant to the problem considered in this
paper. However, it requires the players’ local cost functions
to be smooth. It should be noted that the methods proposed
for N -coalition game problems in all existing literature are
continuous-time approaches, which cannot be applied to the
problems that can only be modeled by discrete-time systems.
This paper intends to devise a discrete-time gradient-free Nash
equilibrium seeking strategy to drive the players’ actions to the
Nash equilibrium.
The newly proposed gradient-free Nash equilibrium seeking
strategy follows the idea of Gaussian smoothing to estimate
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the gradient of a function, which was firstly reported in [26]
in convex optimization, and further studied in both distributed
optimization [27]–[31] and non-cooperative games [32]. This
type of methods can be regarded as non-model based ap-
proaches, since the implementation of such algorithms does
not require the model information. There are also some other
non-model based methods being employed in the Nash equi-
librium seeking, such as payoff-based methods in [33], [34]
and extremum seeking-based methods in [35]–[37]. However,
the assumption on the smoothness of the cost functions is
usually imposed. With the Gaussian smoothing techniques, the
proposed strategy utilizes the estimated gradient information
in a gradient tracking method to trace the gradient of the
coalition’s cost function. The gradient tracking techniques
were widely adopted in distributed optimization to achieve a
very fast rate of convergence with a constant step-size, see
[38]–[41], but receives little attention in Nash equilibrium
seeking.
B. Contributions
The major contributions of this paper are threefold.
1) Different from the existing works on N -coalition game
problems [21]–[24], the problem considered in this paper
follows the settings in [25], where the players are
assumed to have no access to the explicit functional
form but only the function value of their local cost
functions. However, unlike the work in [25], this paper
does not suppose any smoothness assumption on the
players’ local cost functions, which allows the problem
to be non-smooth.
2) As the methods proposed for N -coalition game prob-
lems in all existing literature [21]–[25] are continuous-
time approaches, this paper presents a discrete-time non-
model based Nash equilibrium strategy via a gradient-
free method, where Gaussian smoothing techniques
are adopted to estimate the partial subgradient of the
player’s local cost function, and a gradient tracking
method is employed to trace the gradient of the coali-
tion’s cost function. As compared to other non-model
based methods such as payoff-based methods in [33],
[34] and extremum seeking-based methods in [25], [35]–
[37], the proposed algorithm allows the players’ local
cost functions to be non-smooth.
3) The convergence property of the proposed algorithm is
carefully studied. Under the standard assumptions on
the graph connectivity, local cost functions and game
mappings, it is derived that the players’ actions driven
by the proposed algorithm with a small constant step-
size are able to converge to a small neighborhood of the
Nash equilibrium at a geometric rate with the error being
proportional to the step-size. Numerical simulations are
conducted to illustrate the performance.
C. Notations
We use R and Rp to denote real numbers and p-dimensional
column vectors, respectively. 1p represents a vector with all
elements equal to 1, and Ip denotes the p× p identity matrix.
For any two vectors u, v, their inner product is denoted by
〈u, v〉. The transpose of u is denoted by u>. Moreover, we
use ‖u‖ for its standard Euclidean norm, i.e., ‖u‖ ,√〈u, u〉,
and PΩ(u) for the projection onto a set Ω, i.e., PΩ(u) ,
arg minu′ ‖u′ − u‖2. For a vector a or a matrix A, we use
[a]i to denote its i-th entry, and [A]ij to denote its element
in the i-th row and j-th column. The transpose and spectral
norm of a matrix A are denoted by A> and ‖A‖, respectively.
We use ρ(A) to represent the spectral radius of a square
matrix A, and A∞ to indicate its infinite power (if it exists)
limk→∞Ak. The expectation operator is denoted by E[·].
For a function f , ∂εxf(x, y) denotes a ε-subdifferential set-
valued mapping of f(x, y) at x for any fixed y, defined as
∂εxf(x, y) , {g|f(z, y) ≥ f(x, y) − ε + 〈g, z − x〉,∀z}. If
ε = 0, we simplify its notation by ∂xf(x, y), which is the set
of subgradients at x for any fixed y. If f is differentiable, the
subdifferential mapping ∂xf(x, y) reduces to a single-valued
map, denoted by ∇xf(x, y), which is the partial derivative
with respect to x at the point (x, y).
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Game Formulation
In this part, the definitions of an N -coalition non-
cooperative game and its Nash equilibrium are given, followed
by the problem statement.
Definition 1: (N -coalition Games). An N -coalition non-
cooperative game is defined by Γ(I, {f i}, {Ωi}), where each
coalition i (indexed by I , {1, 2, . . . , N}) consists of ni
number of players (denoted by Vi , {1, 2, . . . , ni}) with
their actions subject to a constrained set Ωi, and owns a cost
function f i. Denote n ,
∑N
i=1 ni, Ω , Ω1 × · · · × ΩN . The
cost function f i : Ω→ R is defined as,
f i(xi,x−i) , 1
ni
ni∑
j=1
f ij(x
i,x−i), xi ∈ Ωi, ∀i ∈ I,
where f ij(x
i,x−i) is a local cost function of player j in
coalition i, xi , [xi>1 , . . . , xi>ni ]> ∈ Ωi = Ωi1 × · · · × Ωini
is the collection of all players’ actions in coalition i with
xij ∈ Ωij ⊂ Rp
i
j being the action of player j in coalition i
and pij being the dimension of x
i
j , and x
−i ∈ Ω\Ωi denotes
the collection of all players’ actions other than coalition i.
Collectively, we denote x , (xi,x−i) = [x1>, . . . ,xN>]>.
Without the loss of generality, we set pij = 1, j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I
for simplicity.
Definition 2: (Nash Equilibrium of N -Coalition Games). A
vector x∗ , (xi∗,x−i∗) ∈ Ω is said to be a Nash equilibrium
of the N -coalition non-cooperative game Γ(I, {f i}, {Ωi}), if
and only if
f i(xi∗,x−i∗) ≤ f i(xi,x−i∗), ∀xi ∈ Ωi, ∀i ∈ I.
Problem 1: This paper considers the N -coalition non-
cooperative game Γ(I, {f i}, {Ωi}). Specifically, the players
in the same coalition cooperatively minimize the summation
of their local cost functions, while collectively acting as a
virtual player to play a non-cooperative game with other
coalitions. To achieve the mutual interest inside the coalition,
the players in each coalition i ∈ I are equipped with a
communication network, characterized by a directed graph
Gi(Vi, E i) with an adjacency matrix Ai ∈ Rni×ni , where
[Ai]jk > 0 if (k, j) ∈ E i and [Ai]jk = 0 otherwise. We
assume (k, k) ∈ E i,∀k ∈ Vi. Moreover, it is assumed that all
players have limited knowledge on their local cost functions,
similar to the settings in [25] and [32]. That is, the player can
only access the output of the local cost function, whose explicit
form is assumed to be unknown. Suppose that the considered
N -coalition game Γ(I, {f i}, {Ωi}) admits a Nash equilibrium
x∗. The objective of this paper is to design a Nash equilibrium
seeking strategy such that all players’ actions converge to a
Nash equilibrium.
In this paper, the following assumptions on the digraph Gi
and the players’ local cost functions are supposed as below.
Assumption 1: The digraph Gi is strongly connected. The
associated adjacency matrix Ai is doubly-stochastic, i.e.,
1>niA
i = 1>ni and A
i1ni = 1ni .
Assumption 2: For each j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I, the set Ωij
is non-empty, convex and compact; the local cost function
f ij(x
i,x−i) is convex with respect to xi, and Dij-Lipschitz
continuous in x, i.e., |f ij(x)− f ij(x′)| ≤ Dij‖x− x′‖.
Remark 1: Assumption 2 ensures the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in game Γ(I, {f i}, {Ωi}) [32], [42, Prop. 2.2],
[43], [44].
Next, we define the game mapping of Γ(I, {f i}, {Ωi}) as
given by
F(x) ,
∏
i∈I
∂xif
i(xi,x−i),
which is a set-valued map, and reduces to a single-valued map
if f ij is differentiable.
In this paper, we impose a strong monotonicity assumption
on the game mapping F as given below. The same assumption
was also used in many works, e.g., [32], [45], [46].
Assumption 3: The game mapping F of game Γ is strongly
monotone on Ω with a constant χ > 0, i.e., for any x,x′ ∈ Ω,
F (x), F (x′) ∈ F, we have 〈F (x)− F (x′),x− x′〉 ≥ χ‖x−
x′‖2.
Remark 2: It is known that under Assumptions 2 and 3,
game Γ admits a unique Nash equilibrium.
B. Preliminaries on Gaussian Smoothing
To facilitate the gradient-free techniques, some preliminar-
ies on Gaussian smoothing and randomized gradient oracle
originated from [26] are presented in this part.
For the local cost function f ij(x) of player j ∈ Vi in
coalition i ∈ I, a Gaussian-smoothed function f ijk,µ(x) with
respect to the actions xi is defined as
f ij,µ(x) ,
1
κ
∫
Rni
f ij(x
i + µijξ
i
j ,x
−i)e−
1
2‖ξij‖2dξij ,
where κ ,
∫
Rni e
− 12‖ξij‖2dξij = (2pi)
ni/2, ξij ∈ Rni is a
normally distributed random variable, and µij ≥ 0 is called the
smoothing parameter. The randomized gradient-free oracle of
f ij(x) with respect to player k’s action x
i
k is defined as
piijk(x) ,
f ij(x
i + µijξ
i
j ,x
−i)− f ij(xi,x−i)
µij
[ξij ]k.
With the above definitions, some results for f ij,µ(x) and
piijk(x) can be readily proved based on [26].
Lemma 1: Under Assumption 2, for ∀j, k ∈ Vi, i ∈ I, the
smoothed function f ij,µ(x) and oracle pi
i
jk(x) hold that:
1) The function f ij,µ(x) is convex, differentiable in x
i and
satisfies
f ij(x) ≤ f ij,µ(x) ≤ f ij(x) + µijDij .
Further, the corresponding partial derivative ∇xif ij,µ(x)
belongs to some ε-subdifferential of function f ij(x), i.e.,
∇xif ij,µ(x) ∈ ∂εxif ij(x), ε = µijDij .
Specifically, we have ∇xif ij,0(x) ∈ ∂xif ij(x) when the
smoothing parameter µij tends to 0
1.
2) The partial derivative with respect to xik satisfies that
∇xikf
i
j,µ(x) = E[piijk(x)],
and is Lipschitz continuous in x with a constant L ,
maxj∈Vi,i∈I
√
niDij/µij , i.e.,
‖∇xikf
i
j,µ(x)−∇xikf
i
j,µ(x
′)‖ ≤ L‖x− x′‖.
3) The oracle piijk(x) satisfies
E[‖piijk(x)− piijk(x′)‖] ≤ 2L‖x− x′‖,
‖∇xikf
i
j,µ(x)‖ = ‖E[piijk(x)]‖ ≤ E[‖piijk(x)‖] ≤ B,
where B , maxj∈Vi,i∈I
√
ni + 4Dij .
C. Gaussian-Smoothed Game Formulation
We define a Gaussian-smoothed N -coalition game, denoted
by Γµ(I, {f iµ}, {Ωi}), which has the same set of coalitions
and action sets, but the cost function f iµ is given by
f iµ(x
i,x−i) , 1
ni
ni∑
j=1
f ij,µ(x
i,x−i), xi ∈ Ωi, ∀i ∈ I,
where f ij,µ is a Gaussian-smoothed function of f
i
j as intro-
duced in the previous part. Thus, with Assumption 2 and
Lemma 1, game Γµ admits a Nash equilibrium, denoted by
x∗µ. The following result shows the equivalence of games Γ
and Γµ under certain conditions.
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Games Γ and Γµ
are equivalent and share the same Nash equilibria when the
smoothing parameter µij ,∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I tends to 0.
Proof: From Remark 1 and previous discussion, Assumption 2
implies the existence of Nash equilibrium in both games Γ and
Γµ. Moreover, applying Squeeze Theorem to Lemma 1-1), we
have
lim
µij→0
f ij,µ(x) = f
i
j(x), ∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I.
Then, games Γ and Γµ share the same number of players,
cost functions, action sets and communication graph. Hence
the result holds. 
1In this paper, we slightly abuse the notation µij to represent the sequence
µij,t just for easy presentation without the loss of generality. We mean µ
i
j
tending to 0 by limt→∞ µij,t = 0.
The game mapping of Γµ, denoted by Fµ is defined by
stacking all partial derivatives as shown below
Fµ(x) ,
 ∇x1f
1
µ(x
1,x−1)
...
∇xN fNµ (xN ,x−N )
 .
When µij tends to 0 for all j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I, we denote the game
mapping Fµ by F0, i.e.,
F0(x) , lim
µij→0
∀j∈Vi,i∈I
Fµ(x) =

1
n1
∑n1
j=1∇x1f1j,0(x1,x−1)
...
1
nN
∑nN
j=1∇xN fNj,0(xN ,x−N )
 .
Thus, F0(x) ∈ F(x) as a result of Lemma 1-1).
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING STRATEGY IN
N -COALITION GAMES
In this section, we present the details of the Nash equilib-
rium seeking strategy.
At time-step t, the player j ∈ Vi in each coalition i ∈ I
needs to maintain the following variables: the player’s own
action variable xij,t, and gradient tracker variables φ
i
jk,t for
∀k ∈ Vi. A gradient estimator piijk for ∀k ∈ Vi is also
constructed to estimate the partial gradient based on the values
of the local cost functions. The algorithm is initialized with
arbitrary xij,0 ∈ Ωij and φijk,0 = piijk(x0). Then, each player
j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I updates these variables according to the
following update laws
xij,t+1 = PΩij [x
i
j,t − αφijj,t], (1a)
φijk,t+1 =
ni∑
l=1
[Ai]jlφ
i
lk,t + pi
i
jk(xt+1)− piijk(xt), (1b)
where piijk(xt) is the gradient estimator given by
piijk(xt) ,
f ij(x
i
t + µ
i
jξ
i
j,t,x
−i
t )− f ij(xit,x−it )
µij
[ξij,t]k, (2)
and α > 0 is a constant step-size sequence. The procedures
are tabulated in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 NE seeking in N -coalition games
1: Initialize: j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I
set xij,0 ∈ Ωij
generate {ξij,t}t≥0 ∼ N (0, 1)
set φijk,0 = pi
i
jk(x0), ∀k ∈ Vi
2: Iteration (t ≥ 0): j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I
update xij,t+1 based on (1a)
compute piijk(xt+1) based on (2), ∀k ∈ Vi
update φijk,t+1 based on (1b), ∀k ∈ Vi
3: Output: j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I
xij,t → xi∗j
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
We let Ft denote the σ-field generated by the entire
history of the random variables from step 0 to t − 1, i.e.,
Ft = {xij,0, φijk,0, j, k ∈ Vi, i ∈ I} for t = 0 and
Ft = {xij,0, φijk,0, ξij,s, j, k ∈ Vi, i ∈ I; 0 ≤ s ≤ t − 1}
for t ≥ 1.
To facilitate the convergence analysis, we first make the
following notations for easy presentation. For ∀k ∈ Vi, i ∈ I,
define that
φik,t , [φi1k,t, . . . , φinik,t]
>, φ¯ik,t ,
1
ni
1>niφ
i
k,t,
φt , [φ111,t, . . . , φ1n1n1,t, . . . , φ
N
11,t, . . . , φ
N
nNnN ,t]
>,
piik , [pii1k, . . . , piinik]
>, p¯iik ,
1
ni
1>nipi
i
k,
∇xik f
i
µ , [∇xikf
i
1,µ, . . . ,∇xikf
i
ni,µ]
>.
Then, the update laws (1) can be compactly written as
xt+1 = PΩ[xt − αφt], (3a)
φik,t+1 = A
iφik,t + pi
i
k(xt+1)− piik(xt). (3b)
The following lemma summarizes some basic properties of
the averaged gradient tracker φ¯ik,t.
Lemma 3: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the averaged gradi-
ent tracker φ¯ik,t,∀k ∈ Vi, i ∈ I holds that
1) φ¯ik,t = p¯i
i
k(xt),
2) E[φ¯ik,t|Ft] = ∇xikf
i
µ(xt),
3) E[‖φ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖2|Ft] ≤ 4B2/ni.
Proof: For 1), multiplying 1ni1
>
ni from the left on both sides
of (3b), and noting that Ai is doubly stochastic, we have
φ¯ik,t+1 = φ¯
i
k,t + p¯i
i
k(xt+1)− p¯iik(xt).
Recursively expanding the above relation and noting that
φik,0 = pi
i
k(x0) completes the proof.
For 2), following the result of part 1) and Lemma 1-2), we
obtain
E[φ¯ik,t|Ft] = E[p¯iik(xt)|Ft]
=
1
ni
1>niE[pi
i
k|Ft] =
1
ni
1>ni∇xik f
i
µ = ∇xikf
i
µ(xt).
For 3), it follows that
E[‖φ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖2|Ft] = E[‖p¯iik(xt)−∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖2|Ft]
=
1
n2i
E[‖1>nipiik(xt)− 1>ni∇xik f
i
µ(xt)‖2|Ft]
=
1
n2i
ni∑
j=1
E[‖piijk(xt)−∇xikf
i
j,µ(xt)‖2|Ft]
≤ 2
n2i
ni∑
j=1
E[‖piijk(xt)‖2|Ft] +
2
n2i
ni∑
j=1
E[‖∇xikf
i
j,µ(xt)‖2|Ft].
Applying Lemma 1-3) obtains the desired result. 
Next, we characterize the gradient tracking error ‖φik,t −
1ni φ¯
i
k,t‖2 in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the gradient tracking
error ‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2,∀k ∈ Vi, i ∈ I satisfies
E[‖φik,t+1 − 1ni φ¯ik,t+1‖2|Ft] ≤
1 + σ2Ai
2
E[‖φik,t
− 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft] +
4ni(1 + σ
2
Ai)L2α2
1− σ2Ai
E[‖φt‖2|Ft],
where σAi , ‖Ai − 1ni1ni1>ni‖ < 1.
Proof: It follows from (3b) that
‖φik,t+1 − 1ni φ¯ik,t+1‖2 = ‖Aiφik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2
+
∥∥∥∥(Ini − 1ni1ni1>ni
)
(piik(xt+1)− piik(xt))
∥∥∥∥2 + 2〈Aiφik,t
− 1ni φ¯ik,t,
(
Ini −
1
ni
1ni1
>
ni
)
(piik(xt+1)− piik(xt))
〉
.
Define σAi , ‖Ai− 1ni1ni1>ni‖. It follows from [40, Lemma 1]
that σAi < 1 and ‖Ini − 1ni1ni1>ni‖ = 1, we obtain the
following by taking the conditional expectation on Ft
E[‖φik,t+1 − 1ni φ¯ik,t+1‖2|Ft] ≤ σ2AiE[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft]
+ E[‖piik(xt+1)− piik(xt)‖2|Ft]
+ 2E[‖Aiφik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖‖piik(xt+1)− piik(xt)‖|Ft]
≤ σ2AiE[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft]
+ E[‖piik(xt+1)− piik(xt)‖2|Ft]
+
1− σ2Ai
2
E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft]
+
2σ2Ai
1− σ2Ai
E[‖piik(xt+1)− piik(xt)‖2|Ft]
=
1 + σ2Ai
2
E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft]
+
1 + σ2Ai
1− σ2Ai
E[‖piik(xt+1)− piik(xt)‖2|Ft]. (4)
It follows from Lemma 1-3) that
E[‖piik(xt+1)− piik(xt)‖2|Ft] ≤ 4niL2E[‖xt+1 − xt‖2|Ft]
= 4niL2E[‖PΩ[xt − αφt]− xt‖2|Ft]
≤ 4niL2α2E[‖φt‖2|Ft],
where the projection’s non-expansive property has been ap-
plied in the last inequality. Substituting the above result to (4)
completes the proof. 
Next, we derive a bound on the stacked gradient tracker φik,t
in the following lemma.
Lemma 5: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the stacked gradient
tracker {φik,t}t≥0,∀k ∈ Vi, i ∈ I holds that
E[‖φik,t‖2|Ft] ≤ 3E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft] + 3ni(ni + 4)B2.
Proof: For ∀k ∈ Vi, i ∈ I, we have
‖φik,t‖ ≤ ‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖+ ‖1ni φ¯ik,t‖
≤ ‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖+ ni‖φ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖
+ ni‖∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖
≤ ‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖+ ni‖φ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖+ niB.
where ‖∇xikf iµ(xt)‖ ≤ 1/ni
∑ni
j=1 ‖∇xikf ij,µ(xt)‖ and
Lemma 1-3) have been applied in the last inequality. Squaring
both sides and applying 2‖x‖‖y‖ ≤ ‖x‖2 + ‖y‖2, we have
‖φik,t‖2 ≤ 3‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2
+ 3n2i ‖φ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)‖2 + 3n2iB2.
The proof is completed by taking the conditional expectation
on Ft on both sides and substituting Lemma 3-3). 
Thus, following the result in Lemma 5, it can be obtained that
E[‖φt‖2|Ft]
=
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φikk,t‖2|Ft] ≤
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φik,t‖2|Ft]
≤ 3
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft]
+ 3
N∑
i=1
n2i (ni + 4)B2. (5)
Combining the above result with Lemma 4 and taking the limit
that µij → 0,∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I yields
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φik,t+1 − 1ni φ¯ik,t+1‖2|Ft]
=
(
1 + σ¯2
2
+ 12L2ςα2
N∑
i=1
n2i
)
×
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft]
+ 12L2B2ςα2
( N∑
i=1
n2i
)( N∑
i=1
n2i (ni + 4)
)
, (6)
where we denote σ¯ , maxi∈I σAi and ς , maxi∈I
(1+σ2
Ai
)
1−σ2
Ai
.
Then, we quantify the optimality gap between all players’
actions xt and the Nash equilibrium x∗ of game Γ in the
following lemma.
Lemma 6: Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the players’
actions xt satisfies that
E[‖xt+1 − x∗‖2|Ft] ≤ (1− χα)‖xt − x∗‖2
+
(
6α2 +
α
χ
) N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft]
+ 6α2B2
N∑
i=1
n2i (ni + 4) + 2NB2α2,
when the smoothing parameter µij ,∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I tends to 0.
Proof: According to [47, Prop. 1.5.8], it is noted that
x∗µ = PΩ[x∗µ − αFµ(x∗µ)].
Thus, subtracting (3a) by the above yields
xt+1 − x∗µ = PΩ[xt − αφt]− PΩ[x∗µ − αFµ(x∗µ)].
Taking the Euclidean norm on both sides and applying the
projection’s non-expansive property gives
‖xt+1 − x∗µ‖2 = ‖PΩ[xt − αφt]− PΩ[x∗µ − αFµ(x∗µ)]‖2
≤ ‖xt − x∗µ − α(φt − Fµ(x∗µ))‖2
= ‖xt − x∗µ‖2 + α2‖φt − Fµ(x∗µ)‖2
− 2〈xt − x∗µ, α(φt − Fµ(x∗µ))〉
≤ ‖xt − x∗µ‖2 + 2α2‖φt‖2 + 2NB2α2
− 2α〈xt − x∗µ, φt − Fµ(x∗µ)〉
= ‖xt − x∗µ‖2 + 2α2‖φt‖2 + 2NB2α2
− 2α〈xt − x∗µ, φt − Fµ(xt)〉
− 2α〈xt − x∗µ, Fµ(xt)− Fµ(x∗µ)〉. (7)
It is noted that
− 2α〈xt − x∗µ, φt − Fµ(xt)〉
= −2α
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ, φikk,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)〉
= −2α
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ, φikk,t − φ¯ik,t
+ φ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)〉
= −2α
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ, φikk,t − φ¯ik,t〉
− 2α
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ, φ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)〉.
The first part holds that
− 2α
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ, φikk,t − φ¯ik,t〉
≤ 2α
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
‖xik,t − xi∗k,µ‖‖φikk,t − φ¯ik,t‖
≤ χα‖xt − x∗µ‖2 +
α
χ
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
‖φikk,t − φ¯ik,t‖2
≤ χα‖xt − x∗µ‖2 +
α
χ
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2.
Taking the conditional expectation on Ft gives
E
[
− 2α
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ, φikk,t − φ¯ik,t〉
∣∣∣∣Ft]
≤ χα‖xt − x∗µ‖2 +
α
χ
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft].
For the second part, it follows from Lemma 3-2) that
E
[
− 2α
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
〈xik,t − xi∗k,µ, φ¯ik,t −∇xikf
i
µ(xt)〉
∣∣∣∣Ft] = 0.
Combining the results of the above two parts, we obtain that
E[−2α〈xt − x∗µ, φt − Fµ(xt)〉|Ft]
≤ χα‖xt − x∗µ‖2 +
α
χ
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft].
Taking the conditional expectation on Ft for (7), and substi-
tuting the above relation and (5) yields
E[‖xt+1 − x∗µ‖2|Ft] ≤ (1 + χα)‖xt − x∗µ‖2
+
(
6α2 +
α
χ
) N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft]
+ 6α2B2
N∑
i=1
n2i (ni + 4) + 2NB2α2
− 2α〈xt − x∗µ, Fµ(xt)− Fµ(x∗µ)〉.
Taking the limit that µij → 0,∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I yields
E[‖xt+1 − x∗‖2|Ft] ≤ (1 + χα)‖xt − x∗‖2
+
(
6α2 +
α
χ
) N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2|Ft]
+ 6α2B2
N∑
i=1
n2i (ni + 4) + 2NB2α2
− 2α〈xt − x∗, F0(xt)− F0(x∗)〉.
By Assumption 3 that
〈xt − x∗, F0(xt)− F0(x∗)〉 ≥ χ‖xt − x∗‖2,
we obtain the desired result. 
Next, we are ready to establish the convergence of all
players’ actions to the unique Nash equilibrium of game Γ
with the help of the following definitions.
Ψt ,
[
E[‖xt − x∗‖2]∑N
i=1
∑ni
k=1 E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2]
]
,
Mα ,
[
1− k1α k2α+ k3α2
0 1− k5 + k4α2
]
,
Υα ,
[
k6α
2
k7α
2
]
.
where k1 = χ, k2 = 1/χ, k3 = 6, k4 , 12L2ς
∑N
i=1 n
2
i ,
k5 , 1−σ¯
2
2 , k6 , 6B2
∑N
i=1 n
2
i (ni + 4) + 2NB2 and k7 ,
12L2B2ς(∑Ni=1 n2i )(∑Ni=1 n2i (ni + 4)).
Following the results in Lemma 6 and (6) and taking
the total expectation on both sides, we obtain the following
dynamical system:
Ψt+1 ≤MαΨt + Υα. (8)
Then the convergence of all players’ actions to a neighborhood
of the unique Nash equilibrium x∗ is established based on the
above dynamical system, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Let the
player’s action {xij,t}t≥0 and gradient tracker {φijk,t}t≥0 be
generated by (1) with a constant step-size α satisfying
0 < α < min
{
1
k1
,
√
k5
k4
}
.
Then, we have ρ(Mα) < 1, and sup`≥t E[‖x` − x∗‖2]
(respectively, sup`≥t
∑N
i=1
∑ni
k=1 E[‖φik,` − 1ni φ¯ik,`‖2])
converges to lim supt→∞ E[‖xt − x∗‖2] (respectively,
lim supt→∞
∑N
i=1
∑ni
k=1 E[‖φik,t−1ni φ¯ik,t‖2]) at a geometric
rate with exponent ρ(Mα), when the smoothing parameter
µij ,∀j ∈ Vi, i ∈ I tends to 0. Moreover,
lim sup
t→∞
E[‖xt − x∗‖2] ≤ O(α),
lim sup
t→∞
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2] ≤ O(α2).
Proof: For the dynamical system (8), if ρ(Mα) < 1, then
Mα converges to 0 at a geometric rate with exponent
ρ(Mα) [48], which implies that sup`≥t E[‖x` − x∗‖2] and
sup`≥t
∑N
i=1
∑ni
k=1 E[‖φik,` − 1ni φ¯ik,`‖2], respectively, con-
verge to some neighborhood of 0 with the same rate.
Since the matrix Mα is upper triangular, its spectral radius
can be easily obtained by
ρ(Mα) = max{|1− k1α|, 1− k5 + k4α2}.
To ensure that ρ(Mα) < 1, it suffices to set
0 < α < min
{
1
k1
,
√
k5
k4
}
.
To find out the steady-state value of Ψt, taking the limsup
on both sides of (8) gives
lim sup
t→∞
Ψt ≤Mα lim sup
t→∞
Ψt + Υ,
we obtain
(I2 −Mα) lim sup
t→∞
Ψt ≤ Υ.
Notice that
I2 −Mα =
[
k1α −(k2α+ k3α2)
0 k5 − k4α2
]
.
Its determinant can be obtained that
Det(I2 −Mα) = k1α(k5 − k4α2) > 0.
Hence, I2 −Mα is invertible. Then, we can obtain that
lim sup
t→∞
E[‖xt − x∗‖2] ≤ [(I2 −Mα)−1Υ]1
≤ k6α
2(k5 − k4α2) + k7α2(k2α+ k3α2)
k1α(k5 − k4α2) = O(α),
and
lim sup
t→∞
N∑
i=1
ni∑
k=1
E[‖φik,t − 1ni φ¯ik,t‖2] ≤ [(I2 −Mα)−1Υ]2
≤ k7α
2k1α
k1α(k5 − k4α2) = O(α
2),
which completes the proof. 
Remark 3: Theorem 1 characterizes the convergence perfor-
mance of the proposed algorithm. It shows that the players’
actions converge to a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium
at a geometric rate with the error bounded by a term which is
proportional to the step-size. When the step-size gets smaller,
the error bound also decreases, leading to a better accuracy.
Fig. 1. Communication network.
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Fig. 2. Trajectories of players’ actions in coalition 1.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we illustrate the performance of the proposed
algorithm with a numerical example for the Cournot compe-
tition game [24]. The game consists of N = 4 coalitions with
each coalition i having ni = 6 players. The local cost function
of player j ∈ {1, . . . , 6} in coalition i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} is given
by
f ij(x) = c
i
j(x)− xijpij(x),
where
cij(x) = 5(x
i
j)
2 + 5xij + 5|xij − 6j|,
p1j (x) = 60− x1j − x2j − x3j − x4j ,
p2j (x) = 60− x2j ,
p3j (x) = 60− x1j − x2j ,
p4j (x) = 60− x1j − x2j − x3j .
Thus, it is obvious to see that the problem is non-smooth
and satisfy Assumptions 2 and 3. The directed communication
graph for each coalition i is as shown in Fig. 1. Then, it is
easy to find an associated adjacency matrix Ai satisfying As-
sumption 1. In the simulation, we set the smoothing parameter
µik = 0.1/k + 1. To validate the convergence of the players’
actions, we set the constant step-size α = 0.1. The algorithm
is initialized with arbitrary xij,0 and φ
i
jk,0 = pi
i
jk(x0). The
trajectories of the players’ actions for four coalitions are
plotted in Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. As can be seen from
these figures, all players’ actions can approximately converge
to the Nash equilibrium.
To verify the convergence rate, we set the constant step-size
α = 0.02, 0.03, 0.05 and 0.1. The trajectories of the error gap
‖xt−x∗‖ with all these step-sizes are plotted in Fig. 6. As can
be observed, the error gap descends linearly in the log-scale
plot for all cases. Moreover, when the step-size α is smaller,
the convergence rate is slower but leading to a better accuracy,
which verifies the derived results in Theorem 1.
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Fig. 3. Trajectories of players’ actions in coalition 2.
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Fig. 4. Trajectories of players’ actions in coalition 3.
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Fig. 5. Trajectories of players’ actions in coalition 4.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied an N -coalition non-
cooperative game problem, where players have no access to
the explicit form but only the value of their local cost func-
tions. A discrete-time gradient-free Nash equilibrium seeking
algorithm, based on the gradient tracking method, has been
proposed to search for the Nash equilibrium of the game.
Under a strongly monotone game mapping condition, we have
established that all players’ actions converge linearly to a
neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium with a sufficiently small
constant step-size. The performance of the proposed algorithm
has been illustrated in numerical simulations.
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Fig. 6. Trajectories of the error gap ‖xt − x∗‖.
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